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1. Introduction 
Haiman (1978) once argued that conditionals are uniformly defined as 
topics. His argument had to suffer from some substantial problems both 
empirically and theoretically. Despite these problems, his paper was a 
trailblazing research that opened up the path for the study of 
conditionals from a discourse point of view. The present paper studies 
conditionals from a particular aspect of discourse functional perspective 
by analyzing the information structure of conditional sentences in 
natural discourse. Ford and Thompson (1986) studied the discourse 
function of conditionals in the similar vein through a corpus-based 
research. This paper also attempts to understand the discourse function 
of conditionals, but it does it under a rather different standpoint, under 
the framework of the so-called GIVEN-NEW taxonomy as presented in 
Prince (1992). 
In this paper, we focus on the definition of topic as an entity that 
represents the GIVEN or OLD information to be checked against the 
information in the preceding linguistic context. By analyzing the data of 
the English if-clauses in natural discourse both in oral and written 
contexts, we present sufficient evidence to show that conditionals are 
not simply topics (GIVEN information). It is revealed that the if-clauses 
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should be viewed as carrying the NEW or INFERRABLE information as 
well as the GIVEN information (in the sense defined in Prince (1992)). 
Along with these findings, we observe that the speaker's choice of 
clause order in English conditionals is closely related to the information 
status of the conditional antecedent in a local discourse context. In 
particular, we observe that the speaker is motivated to shift the 
conditional antecedent to the final position only in a limited context 
where it is not inferentially linked to the preceding context. Then we 
argue that this motivation stems from the underlying discourse principle 
of putting something GIVEN or INFERRABLE before introducing 
something NEW for a smooth transition of discourse flow. 
The paper proceeds in the following fashion. In the immediately 
following section 2, we briefly review Haiman's (1978) claim and reveal 
the shortcomings of his argument. Then, as a theoretical background for 
subsequent discussion, we briefly sketch the main ideas in the 
GIVEN-NEW taxonomy as presented in Prince (1992). In section 3, we 
analyze the information status of the English if-clauses in natural 
discourse by discussing a wide range of corpus data, both written and 
spoken. In section 4, in connection with the findings in section 3, we 
discuss the interaction between the information status of conditionals 
and the clause order. We attempt to explain under a general discourse 
principle why the speaker is sometimes motivated to shift the 
conditional antecedent to the final position in English. Finally, in section 
5, we summarize the main findings and arguments in the paper and 
make some closing remarks. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Two notions of TOPIC and Haiman (1978) 
The notion of TOPIC has been widely used in the field of linguistics, 
but its definition is far from being a settled issue. Amid all different 
kinds of approaches to the notion of TOPIC, there are basically two 
approaches with which most linguists agree to define its core concept. 
One is to define it as an entity that expresses what the sentence is 
about, as in the definition by Reinhart (1982 : 55). The other is to define 
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it as an entity that represents the GIVEN or OLD information, as in the 
definitions by Kuno (1972), Chafe (1976), Prince (1981) and Gundel (1985). 
The basic difference between these two approaches is that while the 
former view presents the topichood as a relation between an argument 
and a proposition relative to a context, the latter portrays it as a 
property of the referent denoted by a linguistic expression in the flow 
of discourse. 
Haiman (1978) claimed that conditionals are uniformly defined as 
topics. He argued that all if-clauses in (1) below share a common 
meaning as the topics of the sentences. 
(1) a. If Max comes, we'll play poker. 
b. If ice is left in the sun, it melts. 
c. If you are so smart, why aren't you rich? 
d. There's food in the fridge, if you're hungry. Haiman (1978 : 564) 
He led to this argument without discussing any data of conditionals in 
actual discourse context. It is rather surprising to find that Haiman's 
main source of data came from some constructed examples of single 
sentences that are taken out of utterance context, considering that the 
main focus of his research is a comparison of conditionals with such an 
inherently discourse-bound notion as topics. 
As it turns out, Haiman's position on the definition of topics as related 
to his uniform definition of conditionals is not clear. The definition of 
topic Haiman seems to have in mind in (1) above is the definition of 
topic in the sense of ABOUTNESS. However, in the later stage, he clearly 
came up with the definition of topic as a discourse-bound entity ~s in (2). 
(2) The topic represents an entity whose existence is agreed upon by 
the speaker and his audience. As such, it constitutes the 
framework which has been selected for the following discourse. 
Haiman (1978 : 58) 
Haiman then compared this definition of topic with his characterized 
definition of conditionals as in (3) and this led him to the conclusion 
that conditionals are topics. 
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(3) A conditional clause is (perhaps only hypothetically) a part of the 
knowledge shared by the speaker and his listener. As such, it 
constitutes the framework which has been selected for the 
following discourse. Haiman (1978 : 56) 
The definition of topic Haiman has in mind here is obviously the 
definition of topic as given or old information (specifically as SHARED 
KNOWLEDGE). In the following discussions, we show that Haiman's 
uniform definition of conditionals as topics cannot be maintained in 
both definitions of topic. 
First, Akatsuka (1986: 340) pointed out a general problem in 
characterizing the conditionals as given (shared knowledge). She noted 
that the inner world of consciousness of other people belongs to 
unsharable knowledge, but such things are often conditionalized as in (4). 
(4) (A mother and her son are waiting for the bus on a wintry day. 
The son is trembling in the cold wind:) 
a. Son: Mommy, I'm so cold. 
b. Mother: Poor thing! If you're so cold, put on my shawl. 
(She puts her shawl around his shoulders.) Akatsuka (1986 : 341) 
According to Akatsuka, it is impossible for anyone to enter other 
people's minds and directly experience their feelings, emotions or beliefs, 
and what is registered in their mind is only indirectly accessible to us 
as 'information' through observations of external evidence. Following her 
points, we find it hard to view the content of the if-clause in (4) as 
shared knowledge. For the mother, its content is not shared knowledge 
with her son, but a newly- learned information as she just realizes it at 
the moment of utterance. 
We observe that the so-called SPEECH ACT CONDITIONALS as defined 
in Van der Auwera (1986) are hard to view as given as shared 
knowledge. This type of conditional is characterized by the fact that the 
antecedent contains a (relevance) condition for the speech act expressed 
in the consequent. Consider (5) below. 
The Information Status of English If-clauses in Natural Discourse 487 
(5) A: Did you finish the Physics paper? 
B: If I tell you the truth, I didn't even start it yet. 
Notice in (5) that the if-clause is used to express the speaker's one-sided 
felicity condition on his/her expression of utterance (speech act) in the 
consequent, independent of the hearer's sharing of its content in the 
previous context For this reason, the content of this if-clause is hard to view 
as carrying shared knowledge between the speaker and the hearer.! 
Second, let us see now whether we can save Haiman's argument by 
considering the other definition of topic; that is, in the sense of 
ABOUTNESS. Farkas and Sugioka (1983) identified the following type of 
if-clauses in (6) below as restrictive if-clauses in English. 
(6) a. Cats are intelligent when/if they have blue eyes. 
b. Cats which have blue eyes are intelligent. 
This type of conditional clause is typically found with generic NP 
subjects and it is characterized by the interchangeability with when as 
shown in (6)a. The function of this if-clause is to restrict the domain of 
the subject NP denotation and one of the important semantic 
characteristics of this type of conditional sentence is that it is 
paraphrasable by restrictive relatives as in (6)b. In the conditional 
sentence of the pattern in (6)a, the whole sentence is about the topic 
expression 'Cats' and the if-clause restricts the domain of denotation of 
this topic expression. In this semantic structure, it is hard to claim that 
(6)a is about the conditional antecedent 'if they have blue eyes.' 
Let us consider another type of conditional context. Reilly (1986 : 313) 
identified the following type of conditional in (7) as GENERIC 
CONDITIONAL and observed that it is typically used to describe a rule 
or to predict a law-like relationship between two events. 
1. This example clearly illustrates that conditionals can indeed convey the new information. 
This point will be understood more clearly later in the upcoming section 3.3, where we 
discuss the information status of the conditional clause with a more refined definition of 
'GIVEN-NEW' taxonomy as defined in Prince (1992). 
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(7) (pouring water on cement:) 
If you put water on it, it sparkles. Reilly (1986 : 313) 
(7) describes a co-occurrence relation between pouring water and the 
resultant sparkling. In this kind of context, the if-clause is simply a part 
of stating this regular co-occurrence relation as a condition for a 
rule-like consequence. Notice in (7) above that there is no overt topic 
expression present in the conditional sentence. The topic is situationally 
understood between the speaker and the hearer at a discourse site as 
the action of pouring water on cement is taking place. In this context, 
(7) provides a new information about this topic and this if-clause is 
simply a part of this new information. It is hard to state that the whole 
sentence (7) is about the content of this if-clause 'If you put water on 
it.' The discussion of the data in (6) and (7) so far proves that the 
uniform definition of conditionals as topics in the sense of ABOUTNESS 
cannot be maintained, either. 
In this section, we observed that Haiman's (1978) uniform definition of 
conditionals as topics cannot be maintained in both definitions of 
topichood. This suggests that we need to characterize the discourse 
function of conditionals in a different way. His research, however, 
deserves credit for opening up the venue for us to turn our attention to 
the research of information structure of complex sentences, conditionals 
in particular. In the following section, we propose to study the 
conditionals in discourse by analyzing their information status based on 
the so-called GIVEN-NEW taxonomy in the literature. 
2.2. The GIVEN-NEW taxonomy and Prince (1992) 
In the tradition of defining the notion of TOPIC in the flow of discourse, 
the study of the information status of a discourse entity has been one 
of the central questions addressed in the field of discourse analysis. This 
study has been characterized as what they often call the issue of 
GIVEN-NEW taxonomy. The terms GIVEN/OLD and NEW information 
have meant a variety of things in the literature over the years. Prince 
(1992) presented a succinct account of different notions of 'GIVEN-NEW' 
information. Among them, there are two notions that are crucially 
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relevant for the current discussion. One is the definition of 'GIVEN-NEW' 
information in the hearer's heaci The other is the definition of 
'GIVEN-NEW' information in the discourse model. According to Prince 
(1992:302), in the former notion, a discourse entity is considered given or 
new depending on the speaker's belief about the hearer's belief, whereas 
in the latter notion what is crucial is whether or not that discourse 
entity was evoked in the previous discourse. 
Let us discuss some concrete examples from Prince (1992: 303) to 
clearly understand these two definitions. Consider (8) below. 
(8) a. I'm waiting for it to be noon so I can call Sandy Thompson. 
b. Why are you trying to get in touch with Sandy Thompson? 
Prince (1992) observed that the same discourse entity Sandy Thompson 
carries two different kinds of information in (8) above. When the 
speaker initiates a discourse by uttering (8)a to a colleague, for instance, 
slhe assumes that this colleague already has a mental entity with the 
attribute of having the name of Sandy Thompson. Thus, this entity in 
(8)a should be viewed as discourse-new but hearer-old. However, the 
same entity should be viewed as discourse-old and hearer-old as in (8)b. 
Notice in (8)b that Sandy Thompson was already evoked in the 
previous discourse in (8)a and thus it should be discourse-old. It is also 
hearer-old since the speaker can assume that the hearer knows this 
entity as an old information. 
Besides these two definitions of 'GIVEN-NEW' taxonomy, Prince (1992) 
introduced another term to capture the discourse entity which cannot be 
completely given or new from the perspectives of two definitions. 
According to Prince (1992 : 304), when a speaker evokes some entity in 
the discourse, it is often the case that slhe assumes that the hearer can 
infer the (discourse) existence of certain other entities via the speaker's 
logical reasoning or by some inferential links. 
Consider (9) from Prince (1992 : 305). 
(9) a. He passed by the door of the Bastille and the door was painted 
purple. 
b. He passed by the Bastille and the door was painted purple. 
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Prince observed that in (9)a the italicized NP the door was evoked in 
the previous discourse; hence it is discourse-old. However, in (9)b, it was 
not evoked in the previous discourse and thus cannot be viewed as 
discourse-old. However, this door is treated as though it were already 
known to the hearer, as signaled by the use of definite article the. The 
point is that it is inferentially related, via a salient set relation, to an 
entity already evoked in the prior discourse. In particular, every speaker 
can assume that once the entity Bastille (a prison) is evoked in the 
discourse, one can think of it having a door. Thus, we can attach the 
definite article as an entity that is not totally new but somehow related 
and linked to the previous discourse context. Prince called this kind of 
discourse entity as the INFERRABLE entity. 
3. The Information Status of the If-clauses in Natural Discourse 
3.1. Conditionals as carrying the GIVEN information 
One of the most common ways in which a conditional clause is linked 
to the preceding context is that the conditional clause is used to repeat 
an earlier claim as a hypothetical possibility. Akatsuka (1985 : 628) noted 
a context where the antecedent of a conditional expresses information 
which the speaker has just received from his interlocutor at a discourse 
site. Consider (10) below. 
(10) A: Ken says he lived in Japan when he was a kid. 
B: Gee. If he lived in Japan when he was a kid, why doesn't he 
have an accent? Akatsuka (1985 : 628) 
Akatsuka observed that the it-clause in (10) expresses what she called the 
newly-learned information that has just entered the consciousness of the 
speaker at the discourse site. From the perspective of the GIVEN-NEW 
taxonomy in the definition of Prince (1992), the if-clause in (10) should be 
viewed as discourse-old and hearer-old as well, since its content directly 
quotes what the hearer said and it was evoked in the previous discourse. 
The use of a conditional to directly repeat what was evoked earlier in 
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the previous discourse as a discourse-old entity is very commonly found 
in everyday discourse.2 The speaker often directly quotes what the 
hearer utters as his/her belief or opinion and assumes it to be true as a 
hypothesis as in (ll). 
(11) (A and B are talking about who is the best quarterback in the 
NFL this year:) 
A: I think Brett Favre is still the best QB in the NFL today. 
B: If Brett Favre is the best QB, why did he fail to lead his team 
to the Super Bowl this year? 
(QB: quarterback, NFL: National Football League) 
Notice in (11) that the if-clause is used to quote the hearer's belief as a 
conditional antecedent. In this context, this if-clause is viewed to carry 
the discourse-old and hearer-old information. Notice that the content of 
the if-clause was evoked in the previous discourse and the speaker 
surely knows it is in the hearer's consciousness because it was uttered 
by the hearer. 
Now let us consider a slightly different context. Consider (12) below. 
(12) (A and B open the refrigerator door and find some beer:) 
A: If there is some beer, we have to drink some. 
B: Absolutely! 
2. The fact that Korean reserves a particular form of conditional marker, -tamyen, instead of 
the prototypical conditional marker, -myen, for this kind of conditional context strongly 
confirms that it is one of the most prevailing discourse contexts of conditionals in natural 
language. Notice in (1) below that -tamyen is used to directly quote what the speaker A 
said. In this kind of conditional context, -tamyen is favored over -myen for a rhetoric 
reason to express the speaker's challenging attitude against the addressee's statement. 
(1) a. A:. Chelswu-ka ttokttokha-n-kes kath-a 
Chelswu-NOM smart-seem to be-DEC 
'I think Chelswu is smart.' 
b. B: Chelswu-ka ttokttokha-tamyen(#myen) way 
Chelswu-NOM be smart-if why 
tayhak-ey-nun mos ka-ss-ni 
college-to-TOP not go-PAST-Q 
'If Chelswu is smart, why did he fail to go to college?' 
Refer to Lee, C-B (2000) for a variety of speaker attitudes the conditional marker -tamyen 
expresses in its felicitous contexts and the systematic division of labor between the 
-tam yen conditionals and the -m yen conditionals. 
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Akatsuka (1985) observed that what the speaker just realizes at a 
discourse site can be subject to be marked by the conditional antecedent 
and what she called the speaker attitude of SUDDEN REALIZATION is 
expressed by it. In this context, what the speaker connotes in using the 
if-clause in the 'If 51, 52' structure is characterized by the speaker 
attitude of 'I just realize 51.' In particular, what the speaker intends to 
say by uttering the conditional sentence in (12) above is something like 
'I just realize that there is some beer in the refrigerator. I am so happy 
to find some, so we should enjoy. drinking some.' In this context, notice 
that the information status of the if-clause should be discourse-new 
because it was never evoked in the previous discourse, but hearer-old 
because the speaker can assume that its content is in the consciousness 
of the hearer at the moment of utterance. Thus, the information status 
of this if-clause is given only in one notion of 'GIVEN'; that is, in the 
hearer's head. 
3.2. Conditionals as carrying the INFERRABLE information 
We have seen the data where the if-clauses carry the 'GIVEN' 
information at least in one notion of 'GIVEN.' Now, we find that in 
many instances of conditionals, they cannot be viewed as 'GIVEN' in 
either definitions. Instead, we observe that the information status of the 
if-clauses in these contexts is best viewed to carry what Prince (1992) 
called the INFERRABLE information in the sense that the hearer can 
infer the (discourse) existence of certain other entities by an inferential 
link to the preceding context. We will further notice that this inferential 
link can be either through various forms of logical reasoning or through 
the bridge of inferential meaning implicitly created by the speaker in a 
given context, such as conversational implicature. 
3.2.1. Salient set relation (X. If a, c. If b, d.), [X={a, bll 
Schiffrin (1992:187) observed that one of the important discourse 
functions of conditionals is that when questions are evoked in the 
previous discourse, the options are specified through conditionals. This 
kind of discourse function by the English if-clause is frequently 
observed in everyday discourse. Consider (13). 
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(13) A: I wonder what the weather is going to be like tomorrow. What 
do you think we should do tomorrow? 
B: If it's sunny, let's go to the beach, and if it rains, let's rent 
some movie tapes and watch them at home. 
Notice in (13) above that the propositional contents of two if-clauses 
describe two possible options for the evoked question 'What's the 
weather going to be like tomorrow?' The information status of each 
if-clause in this context is not completely given or new in the sense 
that it can be inferred by a kind of logical reasoning; that is, a salient 
set relation (a set of two relevant answers, {a,b}, connected to the 
question X evoked in the previous discourse). I claim that this use of a 
conditional antecedent is best viewed to carry the INFERRABLE 
information in the definition of Prince (1992). 
This notion of salient set relation turns out to be frequently observed 
in conditionals used in written discourses, too. Let us consider one such 
example from the New Testament as in (14).3 
(14) (From New Testament: Matthew 18 : 15) 
If your brother does something wrong, go and have it out with 
him alone, between your two selves. If he listens to you, you 
have won back your brother. If he does not listen, take one or 
two others along with you. 
Observe in (14) that two ifclauses provide a pair of contrastive 
hypothetical options for the command 'go and have it out with him 
alone, between your two selves.' The person is either expected to listen 
to one's persuasion or refuse to do so. The content of each if-clause 
illustrates one of these two possible situations. In this context, the 
information status of each if-clause is viewed to carry the INFERRABLE 
information since its content is inferentially linked to the preceding 
command through a salient set relation (a set of two relevant answers 
exhausts the possible world that is expected to occur after the command 
evoked in the previous discourse). 
3. All the examples from the New Testamet in this paper are quoted from the text, The 
New Jemsalem Bible. 1998. New York: Double Day publishing company. 
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3.2.2. Exemplification (Generalization X. If x, y.) [x is an instance/ 
example of X.J 
Another important discourse function of conditionals is to give an 
example as one of many possible options from a general remark in the 
preceding context. The if-clause is frequently observed to illustrate a 
possible example for a generalized comment in the preceding context. 
Consider (15). 
(15) Everyone needs to take some time off. If I have free time during 
the summer, I travel to see a beautiful resort with my family. 
Notice in (15) above that the if-clause serves to present a possible 
instance of the generalization expressed in the previous discourse. The 
content of the if-clause above describes a possible example of taking 
some time off. The entire conditional sentence describes a particular 
example showing what one does when one takes some time off. In this 
context, the content of the if-clause can be also viewed to carry the 
INFERRABLE information because it can be readily inferred by the 
hearer by the generalization- exemplification link. 
3.2.3. Offering a contrast to an earlier claim (X. If-X, Y.) 
Another common way in which conditionals are linked to the preceding 
context is the case of the conditional antecedent negating an earlier 
statement or argument as a hypothetical situation. This way of using 
the conditional antecedent is very frequently observed in everyday 
discourse. Consider (16) below. 
(16) I am sure $20 will be enough. If $20 is not enough, please call me 
when you get there. 
Observe in (16) that the if-clause is used to describe an opposite 
situation to an earlier expectation by the speaker. One can readily 
imagine that an earlier expectation or belief can be negated or an 
opposite reality can occur. In this context, the speaker assumes that the 
hearer can infer, by a logical reasoning, a hypothetical situation which 
is contrastive to his/her earlier belief or expectation. Thus, the content 
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of the if-clause can be also viewed to carry the INFERRABLE 
information. 
3.2.4. Linked to what an earlier claim conversationally implicates. 
In the examples of (13) through (16) so far, the content of the if-clause 
is inferentially linked directly to some evoked entity or expression in 
the preceding discourse by way of some kind of logical reasoning. 
However, there are some instances of conditional contexts where we 
cannot think of an evoked entity or expression in the previous discourse 
that creates this kind of inferential link and furthermore the kind of 
logical reasoning is not clear. Consider (17) below. 
(17) A: How are you doing these days? 
B: Well. I have so many things to do these days. 
If I can afford some free time, I would like to visit your place 
some time. 
In (17), the content of the if-clause is not inferentially linked to any 
overt entity evoked in the preceding discourse. Rather, what seems to 
connect this if-clause to the preceding context seems to be a kind of 
indirect inferential link by the conversational implicature. Notice that by 
saying 'I have so many things to do' the speaker conversationally 
implicates to the hearer 'I don't have much free time.' The if-clause here 
describes a possible option contrastive to this implicature. In this 
situation, notice that this logical link was possible due to the 
establishment of this conversational implicature. Considering that the 
hearer can infer the content of the if-clause through this indirect 
inferential link, we argue that this use of the if-clause can be viewed as 
carrying the INFERRABLE information as well.4 
4. Some may argue that this notion of INFERRABLE by Prince (1992) is a vague notion in 
the sense that when some process of inference is involved, there seems to be no clear 
limit in what kind of inferential relation can be viewed to create an INFERRABLE entity 
'in a given context. I admit that the definition of INFERRABLE information is not crystal 
clear. I believe, however, that the advantage of having this notion available as part of the 
whole GIVEN-NEW taxonomy outweighs the disadvantage of its definition being 
somewhat vague. As presented throughout this section, this notion of INFERRABLE turns 
out to be very useful in capturing the kind of information connectivity between the 
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3.3. Conditionals as carrying the NEW information 
We have seen, so far, the examples of conditionals as carrying either 
GIVEN information or INFERRABLE information. In this section, we 
observe that conditionals can sometimes carry new information as well. 
Let us revisit what Akatsuka (1985) called the newly-learned 
information context as our starting point. Consider (18) below. 
(18) (Visiting his friend in the hospital, the speaker says to himself:) 
If he's so happy to see me, I should have come earlier. 
Akatsuka (1985 : 630) 
Akatsuka (1985) observed that the antecedent in a conditional sentence 
in (18) above expresses the speaker's attitude of SURPRISE or SUDDEN 
REALIZATION that something totally unexpected has happened. 
Akatsuka further noted that what the speaker connotes in using the 
if-clause in 'if SI, S2' is 'I didn't know SI until now!.' This information is 
not heard or obtained from the hearer or some other person at a 
discourse site but rather it describes the speaker's own feeling or 
opinion that sprang up at a given discourse site. Then, it is natural for 
such an information to be NEW in the definition of the hearer's head 
because the speaker can never assume that his/her own description of 
feeling can be shared or known to the hearer when it is uttered. Thus, 
from the perspective of the GIVEN-NEW taxonomy, the if-clause in (18) 
should be viewed as both discourse-new and hearer-new, since it was 
never evoked in the previous discourse and its content cannot be viewed 
to be in the consciousness of the hearer when the speaker uttered it. 
There are two other common instances where the conditional 
antecedent is viewed as carrying the information that is both 
discourse-new and hearer-new. One is the SPEECH ACT CONDITIONAL 
context we discussed briefly in section 2 earlier. Consider (19) below. 
if-clauses and the entities evoked in the preceding context in a local discourse context 
where the speaker's belief interacts with the consciousness of the addressee. 
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(19) a. If I can speak frankly, he doesn't have a chance. 
b. Open the window, if I may ask you to. 
497 
Van der Auwera (1986 : 199) 
Van der Auwera referred to the above type of conditionals as SPEECH ACT 
CONDITIONALS in that they are truly conditional speech acts, i.e., if p, q 
speech acts that are not about any conditional relation between p and q, 
but represent p as a condition for a speech act about q. This type of 
conditional has been characterized in the traditional descriptive grammar of 
English (e.g. Quirk et al (1985)) as an idiomatic type of conditional which is 
used as a kind of commentative device or to add a politeness expression.S 
Turning our attention to the main stream of our discussion, it is obvious 
that the above type of if-clause should be viewed both discourse-new and 
hearer-new. Notice that this if-clause was never evoked in the previous 
discourse and cannot be viewed as shared by the hearer at the time of 
utterance. The if-clause here was used to express the speaker's one-side 
felicity condition on his/her expression of utterance (speech act) in the 
consequent clause independent of the hearer's sharing of its content 
Another type of conditional context where we observe the conditional 
antecedent carry the NEW information is the GENERIC CONDITIONAL 
context we discussed briefly in section 2 earlier. According to Reilly 
(1986:313), the GENERIC CONDITIONAL sentences are typically used to 
describe a rule or to predict a law-like relationship between two events. 
In everyday discourse context, we can easily find many examples of 
GENERIC CONDITIONALS. Consider (20). 
5. Iatridou (1990: 50) discussed this type of conditionals as a separate type in English by 
identifying it with a different name from Van der Auwera (1986). She called this type of 
conditional as RELEVANCE conditionals because the conditional antecedent of this type 
does not specify the condition for the truth of q in the 'If p, q' structure, but rather 
specifies the circumstances in which the consequent is relevant. Her discussion provides us 
with some further insight in understanding the characteristics of this conditional context. 
She further observed that these conditionals cannot be captured if we directly adopt the 
paraphrase 'in any circumstances in which p, q.' For instance, we find that the paraphrase 
of (l)b below is really absurd. (l)c seems to be a more probable paraphrase as observed by 
Iatridou (1990). 
(l) a. If you want to know, 4 isn't a prime number. 
b. #In any circumstance in which you want to know, 4 isn't a prime number. 
c. In any circumstance in which you want to know, it is relevant/appropriate that 4 
isn't a prime number. 
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(20) (A and B are examining an electric appliance:) 
A: How do I turn this on? 
B: If you push this button, the power comes on. 
Chang-Bang Lee 
Notice in (20) that the if-clause functions simply as part of stating a 
co-occurrence relation between the pushing of a button and the 
resultant power-on of an electric appliance. In this situation, the 
information status of this if-clause should be viewed discourse-new and 
hearer-new. First, notice that the content described in the if-clause was 
never evoked in the previous context. Second, the speaker cannot 
assume that the hearer already knows the content of the if-clause at the 
time of utterance. It was just provided to the hearer's head by the 
speaker at a discourse site as NEW information. 
4. Clause Order in English Conditionals 
The discussion so far shows that the information status of conditionals 
is not uniformly GIVEN as predicted by Haiman (1978) but rather quite 
diverse by carrying various kinds of information in the dynamic domain 
of discourse context. We have observed a wide range of data of 
conditionals in discourse where they carry the NEW or INFERRABLE 
information as well as the GIVEN information. In the examples where 
conditionals carry the INFERRABLE information, we could observe a 
variety of inferential links at work to connect the content of the 
conditional clause to the preceding ,context 
In this section, we observe that the presence or absence of this 
inferential link in a local conditional discourse context is closely related 
to the speaker's choice of clause order in conditionals. 
4.1. Ford and Thompson (1986) 
Ford and Thompson (1986) reported in their corpus-based study that 23% 
of the examples of conditionals in written English are final conditional 
clauses and the ratio of final conditional clauses is slightly less in 
spoken English (about 18%). This shows that both in written and spoken 
English, initial conditional clauses outnumber final conditional clauses by 
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a ratio of about three to one.6 
The question arises here as to why even this small percentage of 
conditional clauses should occur in final position; that is, what motivates 
the speakers of English to choose the marked clause order over the 
predominant clause order? Ford and Thompson (1986) argued that 
discourse and grammatical factors seem to combine to make the speaker 
to choose to shift the conditional clause to the final position. 
In this study, we focus on the discourse factors directly relevant to 
our discussion. Ford and Thompson (1986: 361) argued that conditionals 
seem to be used when other factors are at work in the discourse to 
make the shared background function less important than such 
considerations as incorporation of other clause types, participant types, 
participant tracking, comparative focus on other elements, or clause 
length. For instance, they argued that written English tends to introduce 
new, heavy or compared NPs in the main clause instead of in the 
dependent clause. Consider one of their examples in (21) 
(21) Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce 
ferocity towards those who are not regarded as members of the 
herd. So it was in the French Revolution, when dread of foreign 
armies produced the reign of terror. The Soviet government would 
have been less fierce, if it had met with less hostility in its first 
year. Ford and Thompson (1986 : 361) 
6. Lee, C-B (2000: 192) reported that unlike English, the option of placing the conditional 
antecedent, the -myen clause, in Korean is much more restricted. No instance of the 
-myen clause in the final position was observed in the written corpus (0/647) and only 3 
instances in the spoken corpus (3/97). Lee interpreted this fact as showing that unlike 
English, the option of placing the conditional antecedent in the final position is basically 
disallowed in Korean grammar. In other words, such an option is syntactically 
unacceptable since Korean is strictly a head-final language. Lee argued that in English, 
placing the conditional antecedent in the final position is syntactically available, and the 
speaker can sometimes take advantage of this option driven by discourse factors as 
pointed out in this section, whereas no such syntactic option is allowed in Korean and 
therefore the speaker has no choice but to keep this syntactic requirement before 
worrying about what kind of discourse structure to build up. He further noted that this 
contrastive fact between English and Korean well demonstrates the general fact that the 
sentence grammar has a priority over the discourse grammar; that is, only within the 
syntactically available options is the speaker allowed to maneuver the discourse structure. 
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Ford and Thompson (1986) noticed that, in the above passage, the 
subject of the consequent the Soviet government is being compared 
with the preceding mention of the French revolution. This comparison 
is most effective if the compared items both appear in main clauses. 
This seemed to necessitate postponing a conditional clause which might 
otherwise appear in initial position. 
I basically agree with Ford and Thompson in that the final conditional 
clause is motivated when a factor such as comparative focus is 
considered by the speaker. Here we have to address a more fundamental 
question of why such a factor motivates the speaker to choose this 
marked clause order of conditionals; that is, is there any underlying 
discourse principle that motivates the speaker to choose to shift the 
conditional clause to the final position? In the following discussions, we 
argue that we can indeed find a general discourse principle that 
underlies the motivation. 
4.2. If-clauses and Inferential Links 
Toward identifying the underlying discourse factor, let us consider the 
corpus data of written English drawn from the New Testament. First, 
consider (22) below. 
(22) (Hebrew 3 : 6) 
But Christ is faithful as a son over God's house. And we are his 
house, if we hold on to our courage and the hope of which we boast 
Notice in (22) that the NP expression his house is a discourse-old entity 
since it (God's house) was already evoked in the preceding context. In 
contrast, the information status of the if-clause is discourse-new and 
hearer-new because the content of the if-clause was never evoked in the 
previous context and the speaker cannot assume that the hearer already 
knows it at the time of utterance. In this information structure, the 
speaker/writer is led to keep the discourse-old link by placing the 
if-clause (NEW information) in the final position. The if-clause is pushed 
back to the final position because something in the main clause instead 
makes an inferential link (the discourse-old link in this case) with the 
preceding context. 
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The following examples illustrate the similar line of motivation by the 
speaker/writer. Consider (23) and (24). 
(23) (Luke 23 : 35) 
The people stood watching, and the rulers even sneered at him. 
They said, "He saved others; let him save himself, if he is the 
Christ of God, the Chosen One." 
(24) (Galatians. 6 : 9) 
Let us not become weary in doing good, for at the proper time 
we will reap a harvest, if we do not give up. 
In (23), the main clause expression let him save himself describes a 
contrastive situation with the preceding expression he saved others and 
thus there is an inferential link (the INFERRABLE link through contrast) 
between them. Similarly, in (24), the VP expression reap a harvest 
exemplifies an earlier general expression doing good in the preceding 
context and thus there is also an inferential link (the INFERABLE link 
through exemplification) between them. The information status of each 
if-clause is, however, discourse-new and hearer-new for the same reason 
as in (22). Then, the speaker/writer is motivated to push the if-clauses 
back to the final position in these two examples to create the 
information structure of the INFERRABLE-NEW ordering rather than the 
NEW-INFERRABLE ordering. 
The discussion of this set of data from the written corpus in English 
conditionals suggests that the choice of clause order in conditionals is 
determined by the speaker's motivated strategy of communication that is 
universal in discourse structure; that is, to put something GIVEN(OLD) or 
INFERRABLE before something NEW. This makes the flow of discourse 
smooth by making it possible to avoid a rough shift. Under this strategy, 
the if-clauses are pushed back to the final position when something in 
the main clause makes an inferential link with the preceding context as 
carrying the discourse-old or INFERRABLE information. Putting this 
strategy into other words, we find that the choice of clause order in 
conditionals is determined by what kind of inferential role they have in 
a local discourse structure. 
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5. Closing Remarks 
In this paper, we argued against Haiman's (1978) claim and presented 
sufficient evidence to show that conditionals are not simply topics 
(GIVEN information). The analysis of information status of English 
if-clauses in natural discourse showed that conditionals should be 
viewed as carrying the NEW or INFERRABLE information as well as the 
GIVEN information (in the sense defined in Prince (1992)). The important 
thing we noticed in a local discourse structure of conditionals was that 
the if-clauses play an important role in making an inferential link by 
carrying either the discourse-old or the INFERRABLE information. We 
found that there exist various kinds of INFERRABLE information 
established between the if-clause and some entity evoked in the 
preceding context due to a logical reasoning or through the bridge of 
conversational implicature. 
Then, we shifted our attention to whether the information status of 
'the conditional clause is related to the speaker's choice of clause order 
in English conditionals. We observed that the speaker's choice of clause 
order in English conditionals is closely related to the information status 
of the conditional antecedent in a local discourse context. The choice of 
clause order in conditionals was determined by what kind of inferential 
role they have in a local discourse structure. We observed that the 
speaker is motivated to shift the conditional antecedent to the final 
position when something in the main clause makes an inferential link 
with the preceding context as carrying the discourse-old or INFERRABLE 
information. This motivation stems from a more general discourse 
principle of making the transition of discourse flow smooth by putting 
something GIVEN or INFERRABLE before something NEW. 
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ABSTRACT 
The 'Information Status of English If-clauses In 
Natural Discourse 
Chang-Bong Lee 
This paper aims to understand the discourse function of conditionals 
by analyzing the information structure of conditional sentences in 
natural discourse under the framework of the so-called GIVEN-NEW 
taxonomy as presented in Prince (1992). In doing so, we argue against 
Haiman's (1978) claim and present sufficient evidence to show that 
conditionals are not simply topics (GIVEN information). The analysis of 
information status of English if-clauses in natural discourse shows that 
conditionals should be viewed as carrying the NEW or INFERRABLE 
information as well as the GIVEN information (in the sense defined in 
Prince (1992)). We observe that there exist various kinds of INFERRABLE 
information established between the if-clause and some entity evoked in 
the preceding context due to a logical reasoning or through the bridge 
of conversational implicature. Along with these findings, we turn our 
attention to whether the information status of the conditional clause is 
related to the speaker's choice of clause order in English conditionals. 
We observe that the speaker's choice of clause order in English 
conditionals is closely related to the information status of the conditional 
antecedent in a local discourse context. The choice of clause order in 
conditionals is determined by what kind of inferential role they have in 
a local discourse structure. In particular, the speaker is motivated to shift 
the if-clause to the final position when something in the main clause 
makes an inferential link with the preceding context as carrying the 
discourse-old or INFERRABLE information. We further note that this 
motivation stems from a more general discourse principle of making the 
transition of discourse flow smooth by putting something GIVEN or 
INFERRABLE prior to introducing something NEW. 
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